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Executive Summary 
Territorial power sharing can be understood as the 
sharing and delegation of the central government’s 
powers and responsibilities to geographical units. 
It can include restructuring from a centralised to 
a federal state, or moving decision-making power 
from a central government to regional or local 
governments. It can also include delegation of forms 
of political, fiscal, or administrative self-governance 
to regional or local groups who make claims to 
govern a particular area of territory.
This research report provides information and analysis 
on when and how peace agreements provide for 
territorial power-sharing, and the implications for 
broader projects of social inclusion.  It forms one of 
a series of reports drawing on the new PA-X Peace 
Agreement Database, on power-sharing in peace 
processes.  Other reports address political power-
sharing, economic power-sharing, and military 
power-sharing, and a related gender briefing series 
draws out implications of power-sharing for women.
Territorial power-sharing is often used in peace 
processes, to accommodate the competing interests 
of conflict parties to territorial control, including 
competing claims to unitary statehood and to 
secession.  Like other forms of power-sharing it can 
offer greater inclusion in the form of self-government 
for groups who have been contesting the state’s 
marginalization of them.  However, territorial 
power-sharing can in turn cause other forms 
of inclusion and exclusion which require to be 
anticipated and addressed.  
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]  Territorial power-sharing in peace agreements includes federal or similar 
sub-divided forms of government, local or municipal government, autonomy, 
and other forms of ‘special status’. 
Most peace agreements that provide for territorial power-sharing do not provide clearly 
for one form or the other. Different elements of all these forms of territorial sub-
division are often combined in creative and multi-layered permutations. This suggests 
that granting autonomy to ethno-national groups is more likely to be part of a complex 
package of decentralizing powers to a variety of sub-state entities.
]  During negotiations on territorial power-sharing, there are critical decisions 
that have implications for the type of inclusion on offer. 
Decisions over how territory will be split, internal demarcation processes, institutional 
frameworks, dispute resolution, division of responsibilities, articulations of the nature 
of the state, and anticipating newly created ‘minority-majority’ dynamics, can all have 
implications for inclusion and exclusion of different groups across various levels of 
governance. Reflection on these decisions may create space in negotiations to anticipate 
possible inclusion dilemmas, and creative ways to manage exclusive outcomes which may 
contribute to future conflict. 
]  Territorial power-sharing arrangements have been reached mostly during 
peace processes relating to intrastate, identity-based conflicts across a 
variety of geographical contexts, including secessionist disputes. 
These arrangements are often agreed at the ‘substantive/comprehensive’ agreement 
stage – that is, as part of an overall settlement framework, and in forms which are highly 
varied, which draw eclectically on existing models of state configuration – often adding 
layering and complexity as a result of negotiating dynamics.
03  //  Territorial Power-sharing and Inclusion in Peace Processes
Territorial power-sharing can be difficult to agree, 
and can throw up new problems of exclusion and 
inclusion.  The review of how peace agreements 
provide for territorial power-sharing, provides a 
basis for the following recommendations: 
]  Analysis on how to ensure that power-
sharing arrangements enable inclusion 
beyond the main conflict parties should 
question the conflict dynamic which the 
territorial power-sharing attempts to address, 
and anticipate lines of resistance. 
For example, identifying whether negotiations are 
attempting to pull a fragmented state back together, 
or further decentralize a federal state to demobilize 
a geographically concentrated minority, will have 
implications for which party is more likely to embrace 
or push against, a territorial power-sharing ‘solution’. 
]  Symbolic naming of the arrangements may 
be as contested as substance, and require 
creative approaches to ‘naming’. 
The multiple meanings associated with terminology 
such as ‘federalism’, ‘autonomy’ and ‘decentralization’ 
can lead to parties favouring particular concepts 
due to what they understand those terms to mean, 
or rejecting proposals due to their terminology, 
regardless of the mode of devolution of power that 
they establish in practice. Opening up space in the 
process for a diverse range of parties to express how 
they understand concepts of territorial power sharing, 
may reduce the opportunities for misinterpretation 
or disappointment. 
Recommendations 
focused on inclusion
]  Sequencing territorial devolution of power 
in stages, to build incremental agreement, can 
help build support for territorial power-sharing 
as a framework for a more inclusive state. 
In some peace processes, comprehensive territorial 
power-sharing frameworks build on earlier peace 
plans or rhetorical commitments to power-sharing 
principles, even if these earlier proposals failed to 
be implemented. These processes raise the possible 
importance of having certain concepts agreed in 
principle at the outset of negotiations. 
]  Creative techniques for formalizing 
‘unsettlement’ may present opportunities to 
promote plurinational solutions to statehood. 
These techniques can serve to reassure conflicted 
groups that they will not lose out by entering the new 
arrangements.  Creative techniques include:
] Providing for extra territorial connections 
 between kin groups
] Leaving unresolved border areas 
] Providing for open-ended unresolved processes,  
 such as by using postponed referendums
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What is territorial power sharing?
 
Territorial power sharing can be understood as the sharing and delegation of the central 
government’s powers and responsibilities to geographical units. It can include restructuring 
from a centralised to a federal state, or moving decision-making power from a central 
government to regional or local governments. It can also include delegation of forms of 
political, fiscal, or administrative self-governance to regional or local groups who make 
claims to govern a particular area of territory.
In deeply divided societies experiencing conflict, territorial power sharing is often 
understood to provide a form of group accommodation – particularly in societies 
fragmented along ethnic, national, religious, linguistic, or cultural markers (Lustick, 
1979). It is frequently suggested as an option for state re-design in states experiencing 
conflict fought along such identity cleavages, when majority and minority groups are 
territorially concentrated. Territorial control and group identity are often intrinsically linked 
in ways that territorial power-sharing acknowledges.  Further, territorial power-sharing 
acknowledges that different groups have diverging ideas as to the legitimacy of the state 
and its government, and are contesting ownership of the same territory. 
For these reasons, territorial power-sharing is often seen as a mode of compromise in 
secessionist conflicts. Rather than changing the international borders of the state, or 
endorsing the status quo, territorial power-sharing offers states and non-state actors a 
mechanism of compromise, although precisely because it is a compromise, the means of 
agreeing on and implementing territorial power-sharing can be fraught and prolonged. 
Although predominant in identity conflicts, conflicts to which questions of identity are less 
salient may also see non-state armed groups located only in particular regions or locales, 
reaching for a form of state-rebel accommodation, also turning to territorial power-sharing 
arrangements as a means of securing an end to conflict. Here territorial power-sharing 
can aim to accommodate competing ideologies and interests as to the future nature of 
the state.
Part I: 
Understanding territorial power sharing 
and inclusion in peace processes
There are various different forms of territorial power 
sharing. Federalism, confederalism, autonomy, 
devolution, and decentralization all entail different 
approaches to territorial self-governance. In reality, 
many states use complex combinations of multi-level 
governance to share territorial power (see Norris, 
2008: 157-185). 
Degrees of power-sharing vary across different 
country-contexts, with different powers devolved and 
retained by the centre. The division of powers may 
pertain to just one part of a state, or across several 
territorial entities, depending on the context. In 
states where multiple entities have devolved powers, 
territorial power sharing can be symmetric, with each 
entity having the same powers devolved in the same 
way, or asymmetric with entities all having varying 
degrees of decision-making power over the same 
policy areas. 
Terminology can be difficult to pin down, as in deeply 
divided societies, the choice of terminology can itself 
be highly contested. Different groups may associate 
different meanings and expectations to the same 
concept. For some, territorial autonomy offers self-
governance and protection for minority groups; for 
others, it implies the fragmentation and break-up of 
the state. 
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Forms of territorial power-sharing  
Territorial power sharing predominantly is part of proposals to reconfigure the state from 
its previous unitary (or other) structure, often responding to demands by ethnic or national 
groups that centralization or exclusion of certain groups must be addressed in order for 
them to demobilize. 
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Number of peace agreements containing 
power-sharing provisions, 1990-2016
Source: PA-X Peace Agreement Database
Of the 1518 peace agreements signed between 1990 and 2016, 494 agreements contain 
provisions for political, territorial, economic and/or military power sharing, with the 
frequency of such provisions remaining steady over time. Within this power-sharing 
sub-set, 208 peace agreements contain references to territorial power-sharing. 
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The following are different forms of territorial 
power-sharing that have been agreed in peace 
processes to manage territorial-based conflict and 
diversity in deeply divided societies. It is important 
to re-emphasize that elements of all the options 
below are often used in complex combinations to 
address claims for territorial self-governance at 
multiple levels, or in separate parts of the country. 
They are also often combined with other forms of 
power-sharing (political, economic, and military), 
both at central and regional levels, in what is known 
as ‘complex power-sharing’ (Wolff, 2013). 
It is also important to note, that there are different 
levels of formality as to how power can be devolved. 
Territorial power-sharing can be provided by a 
peace agreement or related peace process legal 
instruments (for example UN Security Council 
Resolutions, such as UNSCR 2275 (2016) for 
Somalia), but it can be formally institutionalized 
through a central state constitution, or through 
domestic legislation, or as a matter of administrative 
understanding.   
Federal or similar forms of sub-divided government: 
Division of the state into more than one sub-state territorial unit, with power devolved to 
regions, regional ‘states’ or provinces. This includes sub-state units whether they are termed 
as ‘federal’ states or not, and includes a framework in which the units have symmetric or 
asymmetric powers. The central government may retain reserved powers, with some powers 
devolved to the regional units. Key issues for the territorial sub-division of power include 
how to provide for self-rule (significant decision-making powers over areas of vital interest 
for groups) and how to provide for shared rule (mechanisms for groups to participate in 
decision making at the centre, often through a second chamber in the legislature) (Elazar, 
1987). Peace agreements have established or revised federal systems in, for example, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Iraq, Nepal, and South Sudan.  Other forms of decentralization include 
‘unions’ (Comoros), regionalism (South Africa), and devolution (Northern Ireland).
 
Local or municipal government: 
Devolution or decentralization of power to local or municipal districts, below the level 
of the regional government, in order to accommodate a group. This can include political, 
administrative, and fiscal powers. These provisions can provide for symmetrical changes 
or to specific local units. For example, the 2001 Ohrid Agreement for Macedonia provides 
for extensive decentralization to municipalities across the whole country, whilst the 2008 
Doha Agreement for Lebanon, divides Beirut into three electoral districts, but does not 
divide districts in other parts of the country.
Autonomy: 
Development of distinct autonomous zones or regions within a state, with the function 
of accommodating a group, with different powers to other parts of a centralized, federal 
or decentralized framework due to the extent of the autonomy granted. Peace agreements 
may revise or grant greater autonomy to existing autonomous regions. The special status 
province of Cabinda in Angola, Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, Aceh in Indonesia, and 
the Bangsamoro area in the Philippines are all examples of territories whose autonomous 
status was negotiated in peace processes.
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Proponents of territorial power-sharing argue that by 
sharing power between different territorial entities 
and levels of government, groups which have been 
fighting for territorial control or have grievances 
which have a territorial basis (for example, lack of 
access to natural resources) can have their demands 
met.  Where these groups seek not accommodation 
within the state, but secession from the state, then 
territorial power-sharing can be used to address 
some of the interests underlying the push for 
secession without departing from the existing 
state boundaries.    
What are the arguments for and 
against territorial power-sharing?   
Meets minority demands for territorial 
self-governance without ceding 
sovereignty
Grants groups degrees of control 
over issues important to them
Can improve access to decision 
making for territorially disparate 
communities
FOR
Can empower local majorities to 
discriminate against local minorities 
May contribute to the collapse of 
states with a ‘core ethnic region’ 
Risks destabilizing post-conflict 
democracies  
AGAINST
For non-state actors, this may be an acceptable option. Achieving statehood and 
international recognition is difficult and not all entities will be of sufficient size and 
resources to be able to operate effectively as a state.  Furthermore, not all mobilizing 
minorities may wish to achieve full secession, or have the capacity to govern a fully 
independent state, and may be primarily campaigning to have their territorially-based 
grievances and claims acknowledged or remedied though greater degrees of self-
governance. For example, one of the drivers of the 1989-1998 secessionist conflict in 
Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, was indigenous opposition to the conduct of copper 
mining in the area, and the current autonomy arrangements reflect this desire for control 
over issues pertaining to one particular part of the country1.  
From a state-centric perspective, territorial power-sharing protects the state against 
secession: non-state group demands for greater autonomy can be met without 
relinquishing sovereignty or changing inter-state borders. Due to the international norm 
of maintaining state-sovereign borders, territorial power-sharing may be more attractive 
to international mediators and state parties in peace processes, rather than recognizing 
secessionist independence (Caspersen, 2017: 33). 
Another argument made by proponents of territorial power-sharing, particularly forms 
which decentralize powers to municipal or local governments, is that it can improve access 
to public services, and thus address grievances of inequality between groups. By bringing 
decision-making ‘closer’ to the communities affected, proponents suggest that this can 
promote improved efficiency and greater democratic accountability.
For sceptics, territorial power sharing is subject to a variety of conditions which, in some 
cases, can actually contribute to, rather than manage, conflict in divided societies. 
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1 For more on the relationship between territorial power-sharing and economic resources, see the PA-X Economic 
Power-sharing research report, and for the postponed referendum on independence in Bougainville see section of 
this report on Open-ended processes.
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Some scholars argue that instead of including 
minorities into governance, territorial power 
sharing can: 
] empower local majorities to discriminate against  
 local minorities (Kymlicka, 1995) 
] embolden groups to break away from the state  
 by weakening the state’s sovereignty 
 (Snyder, 2000)
] contribute to the collapse of states with a ‘core  
 ethnic region’ (Hale, 2004) 
] increase the strength of regional parties, 
 therefore facilitating those who wish to secede  
 (Brancati, 2008)
] destabilize post-conflict democracy 
 (Graham, Miller and Strøm, 2017) 
] mobilize non-territorially concentrated groups  
 (Tranchant, 2007)
] or mobilize and radicalize other territorially   
 concentrated minorities whose claims have   
 not been similarly met. For example, 
 governments in Papua New Guinea and   
 Indonesia were concerned during peace   
 processes in Bougainville and Aceh respectively,  
 that conceding autonomy would encourage 
 other island communities with discontents 
 to escalate their claims
Territorial power-sharing can also increase levels of 
corruption. Whilst territorial power sharing can be seen as 
a way to bring accountability to the local level, some critics 
argue that issues such as cronyism and corruption simply 
continue or are even enabled throughout regional institutions, 
which provide greater opportunities for local, sometimes 
less accountable, elites to wield power (see further, Haaβ 
and Ottman, 2015, and the PA-X Economic Power-sharing 
Research Report for more on power-sharing and corruption.) 
Even sceptics acknowledge, however, that contextual 
conditions and variables affect whether any of these 
risks happens. In addition to these risks, territorial power-
sharing may be merely ineffective in addressing conflict. 
Whilst devolving power territorially to minority groups can 
address some of their demands, the state will still maintain 
sovereignty over the contested area, and in practice can 
control whether the movement of power away from the 
centre is actually implemented. 
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How will territory be divided? 
 
Part II: 
What are the critical decisions relevant to 
inclusion in territorial power-sharing?
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‘There shall be formed, by an Act of Assam Legislative Assembly, a Bodoland 
Autonomous Council (BAC) within the State of Assam comprising continguous 
geographical areas between river Sankosh and Mazbat/river Pasnoi. The land records 
authority of the State will scruitinize the list of villages furnished by ABSU /BP AC 
having 50% and more of tribal population which shall be included in the BAC. For 
the purpose of providing a contiguous area, ever the villages having less than 50% 
tribal population shall be included.’ 
India/ Assam, Memorandum of Settlement (Bodo Accord), 20 February 1993, 3. (a).
A key decision for parties and mediators is how territory will be divided to accommodate 
identity groups. Peace agreements often create or reform existing sub-state entities, 
and reflect the following choices: do indigenous groups claim ancestral homelands that 
boundaries can correspond to, such as the proposed Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in 
the Philippines? Will parties agree to reflect the territorial distribution of groups along 
conflict lines at the point of a final ceasefire agreement, such as the Republika Srpska in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina? Or will pre-conflict units of governance which have be granted 
new or reformed powers? The following provision creates a Bodoland Autonomous Council 
in the Indian federal state of Assam:
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When parties agree to create sub-state territorial 
entities, a potentially contentious and prolonged part 
of the negotiations can focus on how the geographic 
boundaries of regional or local entities are agreed, 
or how parties and external arbiters may delineate 
territorial boundaries. Key choices can involve whether 
to establish boundary commissions or criteria under 
which to propose new sub-state entity boundaries. 
In the case of Mindanao, the Joint Statement from 
the 12th round of exploratory talks between the 
Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front reports that: ‘The Panels achieved 
significant progress in defining the concept, sharing 
the resources and establishing governance in the 
BJE but were held back from reaching full consensus 
by the highly technical nature of discussions on the 
delineation and demarcation of territory.’ 
The following example from the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina peace process demonstrates the type of 
criteria which parties agreed on to demarcate sub-
state entities boundaries, and how prolonged these 
processes can be: 
What will be the process for 
internal boundary demarcation? 
Case Study: Bosnia and Herzegovina
The 1994 Washington Agreement is often heralded as ending the conflict between 
the Bosnian government and the Croatian Community of Herzeg Bosna, by 
establishing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). It established a 
Federation in the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with majority 
Bosniak and Croat populations, and outlined a proposed confederation with the 
neighbouring state of Croatia. However, this agreement was part of a multi-layered 
peace process formed of local ceasefire and humanitarian deals to build confidence 
between parties, and multiple implementation agreements where the details of 
territorial power-sharing were further negotiated. 
The FBiH was divided into cantons and municipalities, and shared powers between 
the central and cantonal governments, with the option of delegating powers 
to municipalities. The Washington agreement was the outcome of an intensive 
negotiation process at international and local talks, over where exactly the internal 
boundaries for each entity would be located, with both parties keen not to lose 
control of territory gained during the conflict. The Vienna Agreements, signed 
from the 8th to 11th May 1994, contain the agreed criteria for determining the 
territory of the FBiH, and the, principles of the formation of cantons. This included: 
using the 1991 (pre-war) census to identify municipalities with majority Bosniak 
and Croat populations; excluding areas with a majority Serbian population; land 
corridors to include majority Bosniak and Croat territories not close to the main 
Federation area; principles of ethnicity, economy, geography and communications; 
special status for municipalities which do not have the same majority population 
as the canton it is located in; and establishing a mixed parliamentary commission 
of Bosniak and Croat representatives to marker the borders in accordance with 
the agreed criteria. Negotiations relating to the structure of the FBiH, including 
implementing political and military power-sharing mechanisms, continued both 
prior to, and after the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement was signed. 
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When peace processes create regional or local entities 
to accommodate groups, parties will need to discuss 
how to establish or reform political institutions at 
multiple levels of the state. Such institutions can 
include a second chamber at the central level, federal 
state-level or regional legislatures and executives, 
municipal assemblies, local councils, and inter-entity 
associations. The following provision details the 
proposed institutional framework for the contested 
Azawad region in Northern Mali:
What will be the institutional 
framework for sub-state entities?
‘The Parties shall put in place an institutional architecture enabling the populations 
of the North to manage their own affairs in a spirit of participative citizenship, 
based on the principle of free administration and enabling wider representation of 
these populations within national institutions. To this end, the following provisions 
shall be made: At the local level - a Regional Assembly shall be set up in the Region 
elected by direct universal suffrage, to which a large number of competences 
shall be transferred, as well as resources and appropriate judicial, administrative 
and financial powers;… At the national level - the process of setting up a second 
chamber of Parliament known as a Senate, National Council or any other name 
which emphasizes its nature and role, shall be reactivated and speeded up; it shall 
be developed as an institution whose remit and composition support the objectives 
of the present Agreement;…’
Mali/ Azawad, Accord Pour la Paix et la Reconciliation au Mali - Issu du Processus 
d’Alger, 20 June 2015, Section II: Political and Institutional Questions, Chapter 3: 
Institutional framework and territorial reorganisation, Article 6.
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How will responsibilities be 
divided between different levels 
of governance? 
Another critical decision can be to consider how 
powers will be allocated to different levels of 
governance, and how responsibilities will be divided 
between the central government and newly created 
regions. Outcomes of these negotiations may take 
the form of explicit lists, where areas of governance 
are explicitly parcelled-out, or proposed mechanisms 
for relevant competencies that could emerge in the 
future, but are unknown at the time of agreement. 
The 2005 Interim Constitution of Sudan, Schedule 
(C) Powers of States, lists forty-five exclusive 
executive and legislative powers of a state of the 
Sudan, many of which are subject to compliance 
with the National Constitution or national strategies 
and competencies. These powers include the 
constitution, policing, local government, social 
welfare, the state judiciary, and administrative and 
fiscal matters. Schedule (D) Concurrent Powers, then 
lists thirty-two concurrent legislative and executive 
competencies of the National Government, 
the Government of Southern Sudan and state 
governments, which include economic development 
in Southern Sudan, education, health policy, 
and trade.
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These provisions are often accompanied by 
discussions to decide on the level of jurisdiction for 
different types of powers, such as reserved, concurrent 
or joint, and exclusive. Explicitly defining the legal 
nature of certain powers can assist dispute resolution 
mechanisms such as commissions or constitutional 
courts, if the nature of agreed autonomy becomes 
contested during implementation. This can include 
provisions that prevent the central government from 
withdrawing or suspending powers of sub-state 
institutions. The following provision defines the 
different powers shared between the Philippines 
and the Bangsamoro governments:
‘“Reserved powers” are powers or matters over which authority and jurisdiction are 
retained by the Central Government. “Concurrent powers” shall refer to the shared 
powers between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro Government, as 
contained in this Annex and as shall be further provided in the Bangsamoro Basic 
Law. “Exclusive powers” shall refer to the powers or matter over which authority 
and jurisdiction pertain to the Bangsamoro Government.’
Philippines/ Mindanao, Annex on Power-Sharing to the Framework Agreement 
on the Bangsamoro (FAB), 8 December 2013.
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How will disputes between 
the central and other levels of 
government be resolved?
Once parties have agreed to territorial power-
sharing, parties and mediators will need to consider 
what mechanisms can be used to govern any 
disputes, which emerge regarding the application 
of the agreed territorial power-sharing, including 
division of powers, or changes through to the 
boundaries of a sub-state entity. These mechanisms 
are particularly important as they provide 
guarantees to parties that the central government 
cannot remove or suspend promised powers, whilst 
providing a platform for the central government to 
peacefully challenge regional governments if their 
use of powers does not comply with the agreed 
terms. Dispute mechanisms can include establishing 
special supervisory bodies or commissions, ongoing 
political negotiation, and/or the use of constitutional 
and supreme courts, as agreed in the following 
provision: 
‘The Constitutional Court shall rule on the constitutionality of the statutes of the 
Union and the islands. […] The Constitutional Court shall guarantee the distribution 
of powers between the Union and the islands. It shall be competent to rule on the 
conflicts of jurisdiction between two or several institutions of the Union, between 
the Union and the islands, and among the islands themselves…’
Comoros/ Anjouan, Comoros’s Constitution of 2001, 23 December 2001, Title IV: 
The Constitutional Court, Article 30.
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As territorial power-sharing can involve dramatic restructuring of the state’s institutional 
frameworks, parties may need to decide whether to acknowledge the reasons for splitting 
power in this way, and whether a new vision of the state’s new conception of its diversity 
and arrangements will be articulated in either the peace agreements, or in any new 
or revised constitution. These rhetorical statements often acknowledge the role that 
centralization has played in excluding certain groups or sectors of society, and suggest that 
territorial power-sharing can address this, and can be symbolically important in addressing 
historic grievances and articulating a new conception of the state.  Statements of a new, 
more inclusive nature of the state can also keep the promise of territorial power-sharing 
on the table, even if parties are struggling to agree over the specifics of the arrangement. 
They are, however, the weakest form of power-sharing provisions in peace agreements. The 
following extract from an agreement in Nepal demonstrates the type of language used to 
include federal principles as a form of redress: 
Will the arrangements be placed in a new 
articulation of the nature of the state?  
‘In the spirit of the movements of the Limbuwan, Khambuwan, Tamangsaling, 
Tharuhat Dalits, and women; ending all forms of discrimination that evolved over 
a period of 239 years due to the centralized feudal state against the aspirations of 
Adivasi Janajati , Madheshis, Dalits, women, backward groups, minorities and Muslim 
communities, we, the signatories, have reached the following written agreement, 
expressing commitment to build a peaceful, prosperous and modern new Nepal, 
incorporating all Nepalese people, including Adivasi Janajati , Madheshis, Dalits and 
women into the national mainstream, by establishing a federal democratic republic 
based on a new state structure as per the [principles] of a federal system with 
proportional democracy and autonomous federal states.’ 
Nepal, Agreement between the Government Talks Team comprising the Seven 
political Parties and Sanghiya Ganatantrik Rastriya Morcha, 2 March 2008.
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As drawing new sub-state boundaries will invariably create new minorities and majorities, 
a critical decision will be how to anticipate and address these dynamics, and whether other 
mechanisms will need to be built-in to institutional frameworks to promote minority 
inclusion (see further Political Power-sharing Research Report). Considering the new 
minority-majority dyanamics is particularly important when new regional or local entities 
are created to accommodate mobilized minorities, but may then risk marginalizing non-
aligned minorities (groups that were not party to the conflict) and other non-dominant 
groups who do not identify as members of the titular community of the sub-state entity 
(Schou, 2012). 
Choices that various peace processes have needed to consider in order to navigate possible 
new forms of exclusion include: will territorial power-sharing be combined with sub-state 
political power-sharing, as an avenue for non-dominant minorities to participate in regional 
and local institutions? Will equality and non-discrimination guarantees apply to all citizens 
across all levels of the state? How is the nature and composition of an entity articulated 
in its sub-state constitution? Sometimes these discussions can focus only on aligned 
minorities that were party to the conflict to the exclusion of non-aligned minorities, 
or overemphasize the importance of ethnic or national identities over other forms of 
exclusion, such as gender or class (McCulloch, 2018). 
While territorial power-sharing may be the most realistic option for responding to 
mobilized minorities, international actors and mediators should be wary of supporting 
territorial power-sharing solutions that only take dominant ethnic or national minorities 
into consideration, or without substantive, context specific mechanisms for non-dominant 
minority inclusion in regional institutions with stringent equality guarantees. This may 
leave the door open for future mobilization by other excluded groups. 
How will any new ‘minority-majority’ dynamics 
be anticipated and provided for?  
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1. 
When, where, and how is territorial 
power-sharing agreed? 
Territorial power-sharing has been agreed 
in peace processes worldwide: 
Territorial power-sharing provisions have been agreed most frequently in peace 
agreements in Asia, predominantly in the Philippines/Mindanao and northeast India 
conflicts, closely followed by Africa (excluding MENA), where Sudan, South Sudan, and 
Somalia, have a large number of territorial power-sharing arrangements. The majority 
of territorial power-sharing arrangements in Europe and Eurasia were agreed between 
various parties during the 1992-1995 conflicts in Bosnia, whilst agreements between 
Israel and Palestine comprise most of the territorial power-sharing deals in the MENA 
region. The region with the fewest peace agreements with territorial power-sharing 
provisions is the Americas, where Colombia has the most agreements that provide 
for decentralization. Parties, mediators and analysts have proposed territorial power-
sharing as a possible solution in ongoing conflicts in Syria (Araabi, 2017) and Yemen 
(Salisbury, 2015), but as yet, none of these processes has culminated in an agreed 
peace settlement. 
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2. Territorial power-sharing is overwhelmingly agreed 
in processes relating to intrastate conflict: 
The group accommodation function of territorial power-sharing means that it is 
overwhelmingly agreed in peace processes relating to intrastate conflict: of the 208 
peace agreements containing territorial power-sharing provisions, 99% relate to 
intrastate conflicts. This concentration of provisions highlights how territorial power-
sharing is understood to manage conflicts between groups within state boundaries, 
rather than as a mechanism to address inter-state conflicts. However, the territorial 
nature of some interstate conflicts (particularly between neighbouring states), shows 
that the use of forms of cross-border power-sharing to manage contested territories in 
inter-state conflicts can offer creative approaches to contested borders, such as in the 
2000 Joint Declaration between North Korea and South Korea. 
3. Territorial power-sharing is agreed predominantly in agreements 
which attempt to substantively resolve the conflict: 
Territorial power-sharing provisions are most commonly agreed in agreements that 
set out a framework for substantively resolving conflict, especially when they refer 
to multiple issues. This suggests that territorial-power sharing is more likely to be on 
the table in negotiations addressing constitutional arrangements or comprehensive 
frameworks for resolving the conflict across the entire state, rather than piecemeal 
or temporary measures for specific parts of the country (such as localized ceasefire 
agreements). Agreements to substantively resolve conflict tend to include more 
detailed arrangements for territorial power-sharing are agreed (such as form and 
function of regional institutions), particularly where the peace agreement takes the 
form of a constitution.  Where the agreement is a constitution, the agreed proposals 
for new sub-state entities and institutions are often presented to the legislature 
for ratification. 
25  //  Territorial Power-sharing and Inclusion in Peace Processes
4. Territorial power-sharing often uses creative and multi-layered 
permutations for splitting and sharing power:  
Most peace agreements that provide for territorial power-sharing do not provide 
clearly for one form or the other, such as a straightforward form of federalism. 
Instead, responding to the complexity of conflict, packages often include multiple 
forms of territorial power-sharing, such as establishing federal state structures with 
further decentralization to local governments within federal entities. Examples of 
such complex packages include the 2005 Naivasha Agreement in Sudan, and the 
2005 Constitution of Iraq, both of which were agreements to provide frameworks 
for substantively resolving conflict, that include complex combinations of territorial 
jurisdiction. Territorial power-sharing is messy in practice, and granting forms 
of self-governance to ethnic or national groups is likely to be part of a complex 
package of decentralizing powers to a variety of regional or local entities, rather than 
implementing a purely symmetric federal system. Furthermore, peace processes may 
designate special territorial arrangements for areas where the parties cannot agree on 
how to incorporate it into the federal system: the special district of Brčko in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, which is not part of either federal entity, is an example of this (see 
further Creative Options below). 
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What are the difficulties in agreeing territorial 
power sharing?
 
Part III: 
Choices and trade-offs in negotiating 
territorial power sharing
There are several reasons why territorial power sharing can be difficult for parties in 
conflict to agree on during peace negotiations. The difficulties stem from the importance 
of contested territory to particular groups (Caspersen, 2017: 15), and the challenges of 
convincing parties to buy-in to a national political settlement once a state has violently 
fragmented and de facto lost control over parts of its sovereign territory. Although parties 
may have decided to split territorial power, they may continue to aspire to pursue a unitary 
state or secession, and this can make them wary of agreeing to what they perceive as a 
deal that will prevent their future aspiration being achieved. 
For those concerned about state durability, there is a perception that although territorially 
dividing the state may satisfy group demands for autonomy in the short-term, it could 
eventually lead to the state breaking up, as sub-state groups further consolidate control 
over particular regions. This concern can make parties or even mediators wary of devising 
peace plans, which will strengthen regionally concentrated groups, and even reignite 
conflict in the future by acting as a stepping stone towards dismemberment of the state. 
Central government elites can also be reluctant to transfer certain (and sometimes any) 
powers to sub-state institutions, making it difficult for parties to agree on the degree of 
territorial power-sharing, even if they have accepted a territorial power-sharing settlement 
in principle. Even when parties successfully reach agreement over the nature and degree 
of autonomy, implementing the transfer of powers may be delayed, and require further 
agreements to renegotiate or arbitrate the devolution of power. 
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Conversely, once non-state actors have militarily gained control over territories, they can 
be reluctant to relinquish these gains by accepting the state’s sovereignty over a breakaway 
entity, even if peace plans are proposing high degrees of autonomy. Third-party support for 
sustaining self-declared states or autonomous regions, both militarily and diplomatically, 
can further reinforce reluctance to relinquish territorial gains, as can be seen in the current 
conflict in Syria (Barnes-Dacey, 2017). 
Finally, there can be principled objections to granting legitimacy to territories gained 
through violent conflict and ethnic cleansing, by granting them status as a regional 
entity under the control of the actors responsible for gross human rights violations. 
For parties and mediators of the Bosnian conflict from 1992-1995, this became an 
important sticking point for constitutional proposals that divided the state into entities, 
which demographically were a direct consequence of ethnic cleansing (see Anonymous, 
1996 for a reflection on opposition to territorial power-sharing peace plans ‘in quest for 
the perfect peace’). 
The following section discusses the various and creative ways that mediators have used 
to navigate the challenges raised by negotiating territorial power-sharing, when the above 
difficulties have emerged in peace processes. 
What are some of the creative options used to manage 
the challenges of inclusion in territorial power-sharing 
arrangements? 
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Understanding the political 
dynamics of the inclusion goals 
of territorial reconfiguration
Whilst parties and mediators may look to ‘successful’ 
cases of federalism or decentralization to guide 
proposals, different contexts will require tailored 
negotiating strategies.  Territorial power-sharing 
arrangements can have quite different rationales, 
depending on context.  Identifying the type of 
settlement that parties are hoping to reach and its 
relationship to the way the conflict has implicated 
territory is important to anticipating and trying to 
work around lines of resistance. 
For example: 
] It can affect the parties’ incentives, and the   
 type of inclusion on offer whether negotiations  
 are attempting to pull a fragmented state   
 back together (such as Syria), or aiming   
 to further decentralize the state to demobilize 
 a geographically concentrated minority (such as  
 with Adivasi regions in north-east India).
] In states that are already federal or   
 decentralized, governments may be unwilling  
 to agree to proposals that suggest autonomy  
 arrangements that are outside of the existing  
 federal framework, as this could signal to other  
 territorially-concentrated minorities that conflict  
 can achieve greater self-governance gains. 
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If conflict dynamics have already established de facto regional entities under the control 
of non-state actors, then sub-state actors may view re-incorporation within the state, 
even as a highly autonomous jurisdiction, as an unnecessary compromise. Examples of this 
challenge include the Southern Movement in Yemen, Puntland in Somalia, and the Croatian 
Community of Herzeg-Bosna in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These are all regions in which 
minority actors used ongoing conflict between the government and other non-state actors 
to call for greater autonomy for themselves, or established de facto breakaway regions, 
with parallel structures of governance. 
Sub-state peace processes have been one way to respond to these concerns, as a way to 
settle territorially concentrated conflicts simultaneously to ongoing mediation attempts at 
the centre. Whilst not always completely separate processes (due to overlap of mediators, 
or results feeding into international and central negotiations), these processes acknowledge 
that minority claims need to be engaged with, or else may risk progress in reaching an 
overarching political settlement for the entire country. Local clan-based processes in 
Puntland, Somalia, have presented an opportunity to further establish Somalia as a federal 
state overall, as developments regarding its relationship to Mogadishu have served as an 
example for other member states’ relations with the central government (Mosley 2015). 
The peace process relating to the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosna in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina focused on establishing a federal entity with multiple layers of territorial, 
political, and military power-sharing. Agreements relating to this process stated that 
this solution was not subject to whatever agreement was reached with other breakaway 
regions, and that any eventual structures would be integrated with other peace processes 
at a later date. 
Responding to de-facto pre-existing 
regional entities  
‘1. Bosniacs and Croats, as constituent peoples (along with Others) and citizens of 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, 
transform the internal structure of the territories with a majority of Bosniac and 
Croat population in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a Federation, 
which is composed of federal units with equal rights and responsibilities.
2. Decisions on the constitutional status of the territories of the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina with a majority of Serb population shall be made in the course of 
negotiations toward a peaceful settlement and at the ICFY.’ 
Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Yugoslavia (former), Declaration Concerning the 
Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 18 March 1994, I. 
Establishment of the Federation, Article l. 
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A risk with this approach is that establishing asymmetric territorial power-sharing along the 
internal borders of a previously secessionist region can be used as a precedent for future 
mobilization, with claims for self-governance deemed to have been legitimized by the 
peace process.  
It is important to note that governments, their allies, and international coalitions have used 
force to dismantle breakaway regions and parallel governance structures, when negotiations 
have failed to bring them back into the fold. The proposed ‘Zagreb Four’ peace plan would 
have turned the breakaway Republic of Serbian Krajina in Croatia into a regional entity 
with high degrees of self-governance. When rebel leaders rejected the plan, the Croatian 
army (with the backing of the United States) launched Operations Storm and Flash to 
overrun the region and regain full control of the state’s sovereign territory after four years 
of conflict.  
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Often the name to be given the territorial arrangements is as – and on occasion more 
– difficult to reach agreement on, as the substance of the arrangements.  The multiple 
associations with terms such as ‘federalism’, ‘autonomy’ and ‘decentralization’ can result in 
different parties favouring particular concepts due to the link to a future status it implies 
– such as equating autonomy with eventual independence - , and even to them rejecting 
proposals due to the decision to use one term over another. Some names for sub-state 
entities (for example Republika Srpska) have connotations of sovereignty, that central 
governments dislike; while terms such as ‘federalism’ are understood as claims to break-up 
the unitary nature of the state in other countries (this terminology is very contested by the 
majority community in Sri Lanka, and also raises concerns in Syria).  The decision to name 
the territorial power sharing process or resulting arrangements can provoke emotive and 
entrenched discussions. 
In some cases, dedicated parts of the peace process have been dedicated to discussing the 
choice of terminology relating to territory, such as in the Philippines/Mindanao process, in 
order to be clear that all parties understand what they are agreeing to, and ensuring there 
is space to consider what form of territorial power sharing is appropriate for the context. 
Conversely, implementing a decentralized body of cooperation between Serb-majority 
municipalities in Kosovo has been delayed in part due to competing legal interpretations 
of different names for the institution. The term ‘Association’ is preferred by the Kosovo 
government as this implies that the body will conform to the structure existing in Kosovo 
law, and in line with the existing competencies of the Association of Kosovo municipalities. 
The Serbian government, and local Serb representatives, however, refer to the body as a 
‘Community’, which supports their interpretation that it should have greater degrees of 
autonomy than within the current framework for inter-municipality cooperation (Prelec, 
2013). Due to this delay, and other political developments, Kosovo Serbs are currently 
taking steps to unilaterally establish this decentralized body.  
Conceptual clarity, or opening up the process to allow representatives of minority groups 
(beyond aligned minorities or armed actors) to express how they understand concepts 
of territorial power sharing, may reduce the opportunities for misinterpretation or 
disappointment (Swisspeace, 2009); however, this may also prolong the length of time 
needed to reach a settlement. 
Using symbolic terminology to 
creatively name processes  
Tracing references to territorial power-sharing 
throughout peace processes suggests that in some 
cases, mediators of comprehensive territorial power-
sharing frameworks build on early peace plans or 
principles, even where those earlier proposals failed 
to be implemented. This momentum is particularly 
interesting in processes where early rhetorical 
provisions for principles of group territorial autonomy 
fed into later, more-detailed arrangements in 
framework and constitution peace agreements, 
or in declarations of principles following failure of 
comprehensive agreements to stick.
Using sequencing to achieve 
incremental agreement
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The 1992 Carrington-Cutiliero Plan proposed at an 
early stage of the conflict in Bosnia, briefly proposed 
a state divided between three constituent units based 
on national principles, which would create territorial 
units for Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs within the state 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite several different 
ethno-national territorial solutions proposed in peace 
plans during the conflict, the 1995 Dayton Peace 
Agreement continued to reflect and institutionalize 
this initial view that any substantive framework 
should be rooted in a principle of territorial self-
governance for the three largest ethno-national 
groups. In Mali, the 2014 Algiers Preliminary Platform 
and the Protocol D’Entente both contain rhetorical 
commitments to ‘broad autonomy’ and ‘a new form 
of governance that will satisfy the deep aspirations 
and legitimate claims of the populations of the 
regions of northern Mali’. The detailed federal 
arrangements, institutional framework, and territorial 
reorganization provided by the 2015 Accord for Peace 
and Reconciliation in Mali, reflects these earlier 
commitments. These processes raise interesting 
questions about the possible importance of having 
certain concepts agreed in principle at the outset 
of negotiations, and the staying-power of specific 
conflict resolution ‘options’ on peace process agendas.
In some cases, creative approaches to managing 
territory and identity may involve trying to leave 
disagreement over the status of the territory open 
and unresolved, while creating workable common 
approach to how the territories within the state 
will be governed (Bell and Pospisil, 2017). Fluid 
articulations of sovereignty can enable parties to 
enter into an agreement that maintains the unity of 
the state in practice, but by leaving the state’s final 
status unanswered, and instead providing creative 
mechanisms to ensure that formerly conflicted groups 
can live alongside each other in the meantime.  In a 
sense these arrangements formalised ‘unsettlement’ 
of the territorial dispute rather than settling it. These 
creative mechanisms can include provision for:
i. Extraterritorial connections between kin groups 
ii. Unresolved border areas
iii. Open-ended processes
i.  Extraterritorial connections between kin groups:  
 This form of ‘unsettlement’, gives minority groups  
 a solution which goes beyond traditional notions  
 of sovereignty and territoriality, by providing   
 guarantees of membership within other polities  
 through the use of, for example, confederations  
 with neighbouring states or dual citizenship 
 rights. These types of arrangement can offer 
 opportunitiesfor inclusion and conflict 
 management in cases where there are strong  
 extraterritorial links between minority groups 
 and neighbouring kin-states, or where there is 
 no clear majority community. 
Techniques of ‘formalized 
unsettlement’ to promote 
plurinationalism 
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In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
confederation of Croatia and the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) established by the 
Washington Agreement in 1994, gave guarantees to 
the Croat minority that remaining with the Bosnian 
state borders would not limit their access to their 
neighbouring kin-state, theoretically reducing the 
risk of future secession. The 1995 Dayton Peace 
Agreement’s provision for federal entities to maintain 
relationships with neighbouring states also offered 
minority groups the ability to foster kin-state ties 
without compromising their membership of the 
overarching state. Both of these provisions reflect 
the involvement of regional regimes in the 1992-
1995 conflict, and address the complex relationships 
between groups, territory, and neighbouring states, 
in a way that pursuit of a more settled and resolved 
state nature might not be able to.
However, accepting this unsettlement may be 
unsatisfactory for those wishing to transition to a 
more majoritarian democratic system, as formalizing 
this type of unsettlement can make it enduring. 
Additionally, mechanisms which offer creative 
forms of extra-territorial citizenship may create 
an imbalance between those who qualify for dual 
passport regimes, and non-dominant minorities 
who are not considered a threat to the stability of 
the state, and therefore are not included in such 
strategies. 
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ii.  Unresolved border areas: 
 Another form of postponing decision-making  
 relates to delaying agreement on controversial  
 parts of borders, as this allows mediators to 
 propose creative ways of managing contested  
 border spaces, so that parties do not have to 
 agree to cede territory immediately. This 
 creativity can be critical for territories that are  
 positioned on internal borders where integration  
 into one or the other sub-state entity, would  
 be significant in terms of who held the balance 
 of power in the resultant state. 
At the Dayton negotiations for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1995, parties agreed on the internal 
boundaries for dividing the country into two 
federal entities, but left decisions over the disputed 
Brčko area up to a binding arbitration process. This 
agreement meant that the thorny problem of which 
entity could claim this territory could not delay 
parties in coming to agreement on establishing the 
Inter-Entity Boundary Line between the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. In 
contrast to the rest of the country, where all residents 
would be automatically allocated citizenship of the 
entity they resided in, residents of Brčko were able 
to choose which entity they wished to be a citizen 
of (see further, Stjepanović: 2015).
A similar approach was taken in the context of the disputed Abyei region between North 
and South Sudan. As part of the 2004 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the 
Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM-A), 
parties agreed that the disputed Abyei region on the border between northern and southern 
states would have a special administrative status for an interim period. Furthermore, 
residents of Abyei were agreed to be citizens of both Western Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal 
states. The interim period was supposed to end with a referendum on Abyei’s status to 
coincide simultaneously with an independence referendum for southern Sudan; however, 
Abyei is still contested between Sudan and South Sudan, and a UN Interim Security Force 
for Abyei (UNISFA) is currently operating within the region. Nonetheless, the arrangements 
demonstrate the ways in which some elements of the territorial configuration can be left 
more open than others, in-effect staging agreement.
iii.  Open-ended processes: 
 Whilst some peace agreements attempt to formalize the detail and design of territorial  
 power sharing mechanisms, others simply agree in principle that parties will work   
 towards further autonomy or decentralization in the future, but leave the intricacies 
 to be worked out in future negotiations or legislative processes. 
A form of open-endedness for territorial power-sharing processes is sometimes created 
by providing for postponed referenda on the status of autonomous or contested regions. 
In these instances, parties agree to hold a referendum on the area’s status at an agreed 
later date, in order to reduce levels of violence and explore the possibility of maintaining 
unity (Caspersen, 2017: 34), such as in South Sudan, where the 2005 Naivasha agreement  
required parties to use the interim period to develop a unitary conception of Sudan that 
voters would appeal to voters (Part B: the Transition Process, 2.4.2). Although there is 
always the risk that regions will vote to secede, this gives parties and mediators a form 
of breathing space to explore alternative proposals, when other approaches have failed. 
The postponed referenda on the status of the island of Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, 
is another example of this strategy, where the parties to a peace agreement agreed on a 
broad time period to hold the referendum in, with a specific date contingent on parties 
implementing the weapons disposal plan: 
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‘The agreement provides for the right, guaranteed in the National Constitution, 
for a referendum among Bougainvilleans’ on Bougainville’s future political status. 
The choices available in the referendum will include a separate independence for 
Bougainville. The referendum will be held no sooner than ten years, and in any 
case no later than fifteen years, after the election of the autonomous Bougainville 
Government. The actual date of the referendum will be set taking account of 
standards of good governance and the implementation of the weapons disposal 
plan. The outcome of the referendum will be subject to ratification (final decision 
making authority) of the National Parliament.’ 
Papua New Guinea/ Bougainville, Bougainville Peace Agreement, 30 August 2001, 
2. Referendum
Temporary autonomy under international transitional administration can be also be 
a way to facilitate an open-ended process. An example of this is the 12 month UN 
Transitional Administration for the areas of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium 
(UNTAES), formed by the Basic Principles and Erdut agreements for Croatia in 1995. The 
administration was envisioned to end with internationally-facilitated elections for all local 
governance bodies, although the mandate was extended several times via UN Security 
Council resolutions. After a transition to a UN policing support mission, the transitional 
administration ended in 1998, when the Republic of Croatia regained sovereignty over the 
region. International transitional administrations have often used further staged devolution 
of power from international actors to local participants, using provision for a government 
of national unity or other forms of decentralization. 
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Use of ‘constructive ambiguity’ may make it 
harder for disputes over terminology or degrees of 
autonomy to delay reaching a broader comprehensive 
settlement, or it could promote a future and more 
participative process beyond the confines of military 
elites at the peace table. However, leaving the details 
for later can also make it harder to implement 
self-governance reforms, as it may be difficult for 
minority communities to scrutinize details left out of 
a comprehensive agreement, and disputes regarding 
constitutional design may be made more intractable 
without an agreed reference document. If open-ended 
processes are considered, building into comprehensive 
peace agreements a clear path and timeline for 
reaching key decisions and appropriate oversight and 
implementation mechanisms may help to ensure that 
minority group accommodation is not left to stagnate 
once hostilities have ceased. 
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Conclusion 
Territorial power sharing, in theory, offers the opportunity to reach political settlements 
that foster greater inclusion of social groups, particularly ethnic or national minorities and 
indigenous peoples. In practice, however, this approach entails complex sets of institutions 
and principles, which in themselves can become contested and difficult to implement. 
Our data suggests that different contexts will provoke unique narratives from differently 
placed groups, regarding the capacity for territorial power sharing to diffuse or accelerate 
further conflict during settlement negotiations, and that these narratives can shape the 
choices that parties and mediators make during peace processes. 
Whilst devolution of power to a sub-state entity may be intended to be the primary 
mechanism for promoting inclusion of minority groups, there are aspects of territorial 
power sharing which could potentially be used to push for greater inclusion of women 
or non-aligned minorities within these settlements, when combined with other forms 
of power sharing at different levels of governance (see further Political Power-sharing 
Research Report).  Territorial power-sharing arrangements also create their own inclusion 
and exclusion dilemmas at multiple levels of governance, and non-dominant minorities and 
women need to be resourced to engage with proposals and anticipate their consequences 
when territorial power-sharing is raised in peace processes. For a more detailed discussion 
of the strategies that women and non-dominant minorities can use to push for more 
inclusive territorial power sharing settlements, see the accompanying PA-X/UN Women 
Research Briefing: Women and Territorial Power Sharing.
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https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1361/ 
North Korea/ South Korea, South-North Joint Declaration, 15 June 2005. 
https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/541/ 
Papua New Guinea/ Bougainville, Bougainville Peace Agreement, 30 August 2001. 
https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/312/ 
Philippines/ Mindanao, Annex on Power-Sharing to the Framework Agreement on the 
Bangsamoro (FAB), 8 December 2013. 
https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/868/
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Philippines/ Mindanao, Joint Statement from the 12th round of exploratory talks between 
the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, 4 May 2006.
https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/995/ 
South Sudan/ Sudan, IGAD Declaration of Principles, 20 May 1994.
https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/918/ 
South Sudan/ Sudan, Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement (Naivasha Agreement), 9 January 2005.
https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/337/ 
Sudan/ South Sudan, Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan, 6th July 2005.
https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1800/ 
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Resources
The following are core resources for thinking about territorial power-sharing and peace 
processes. For wider literature, see further references. 
Peace Agreements
For full text of peace agreements cited from which data in this report is drawn, and 
searchable provisions on territorial power-sharing see: PA-X Peace Agreements Database, 
University of Edinburgh (www.peaceagreements.org). This database is a repository of 
peace agreements from 1990 to date, current until 1 January 2016.  It contains over 1500 
agreements from over 140 processes with coding provisions for 225 substantive categories. 
For peace agreement texts with search functions see further: 
] Language of Peace, University of Cambridge 
 (https://www.languageofpeace.org/#/)
 This tool provides access to over 1000 agreements for mediators and drafters to be   
 able to compare and collate language on key issues.
] Peace Agreements Digital Collection, United States Institute for Peace 
 (https://www.usip.org/publications/2009/04/peace-agreements-digital-collection)
 This collection strives to contain the full-text agreements signed by the major   
 contending parties ending inter and intra-state conflicts worldwide since 1989. 
 It was last updated in 2009.
] Peacemaker, United Nations 
 (http://peacemaker.un.org/)
 Peacemaker maintains a comprehensive database of agreement texts, and it serves 
 as an online mediation support tool. 
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Key Websites and Literature 
Anderson, P., and Keil, S., 2017.  Federalism: a Tool for Conflict Resolution?. 50 Shades of 
Federalism. Canterbury: Canterbury Christ Church University. 
] Available from: 
http://50shadesoffederalism.com/federalism-conflict/federalism-tool-conflict-resolution/ 
[Accessed 29 September 2017]. 
Development Partners Network on Decentralisation and Local Governance (DeLoG)., 2016. 
Local Governance and Decentralization. 
] Available from: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19tFfvuhLEU [Accessed 15 November 2017]. 
Grävingholt, J. and von Haldenwang, C., 2016. The Promotion of Decentralisation and Local 
Governance in Fragile Contexts. Bonn: German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut 
für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE).
] Available from: 
https://www.die-gdi.de/en/discussion-paper/article/the-promotion-of-decentralisation-
and-local-governance-in-fragile-contexts/ [Accessed 15 May 2017].
Töpperwien, N., 2009. Federalism and Peace Mediation. Zurich: swisspeace/CSS ETH-Zurich. 
] Available from: 
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/FederalismMediation_Swisspeace.
pdf [Accessed 29 September 2017].
Töpperwien, N., 2010. Decentralization, Special Territorial Autonomy, and Peace 
Negotiations. Zurich: swisspeace/CSS ETH-Zurich. 
] Available from: 
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/Peace_Mediation_Essentials_
Decentralization.pdf [Accessed 29 September 2017].
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